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Introduction. This article discusses the controversy
related to the detention and rendition by US authorities
of Maher Arar, a Canadian citizen. The Arar case is particularly significant because of the intense publicity, debate, and mobilization that it has engendered in Canada.
This case illustrates problems posed by the expectations
and practices of information sharing in Canada – US security cooperation.
Maher Arar holds dual Canadian-Syrian citizenship.
In September 2002, he was detained by American authorities in New York, while traveling back to Canada
from Tunisia. US officials questioned Arar on suspected,
but never proven, links to Al-Qaeda and then deported
him to Syria. Arar was returned to Canada from Syria in
late 2003. A public outcry about Arar’s rendition eventually led to the formation of an official Commission of
Inquiry into the Actions of Canadian Officials in Relation
to Maher Arar. In September 2006, Justice Dennis
O'Connor, who headed the inquiry, ruled that there was
no evidence that Arar was ever linked to extremist groups
or was a threat to Canada's national security. He faulted
Canadian, Syrian and American agencies and called upon
the Canadian government to lodge a formal complaint
with the American authorities on the issue. On January
26, 2007, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper issued
a formal apology to Maher Arar while announcing that he
will receive C$12.5 million in compensation. In line with
the recommendations of the Arar Commission, the Canadian government has filed protests with the US and Syria
about Arar’s treatment. With the help of New Yorkbased The Center for Constitutional Rights, Arar also
filed a lawsuit against the US government.1
Arar’s case has led to some tension between the US
and Canada. The Canadian government has requested
that Arar be removed from the US terrorist watch list.
US authorities have not acceded to this, arguing that the
decision to keep Arar on the US watch list is
“appropriate” and based on independent information
collected by American agencies.2 Canadian authorities
have also been unhappy with the reluctance of the
Americans to share information on the case with them, a
point raised by the Arar Report.3 The case could have a
significant impact on the nature and extent of Canada –
US cooperation on counterterrorism efforts.
The American practice of extraordinary rendition has
generated significant domestic and international contro-
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versy. It has come under particular scrutiny from some
of the closest allies of the United States, including European countries and Canada. In general, the practice of
extradition is a formal, legal process through which a person suspected of involvement in illegal activities, including terrorism, can be transferred from one country to another. Extraordinary or irregular rendition refers to the extrajudicial transfer of persons. It occurs when one country apprehends a person and then transfers him to a third
country. Under such circumstances, the detainee usually
does not have access to the judicial system of the state
which apprehended and transferred him. This practice
has become particularly controversial because of allegations that the US government has participated in the
transfer of terrorism suspects to countries (such as Syria)
that are known to use torture. Arguably, various international treaties and conventions, such as the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the Geneva Conventions, prohibit, or greatly restrict, extraordinary rendition. On the other hand, some have argued that exceptions do exist to this prohibition. The current US administration has conceded that it has rendered suspects
to countries that are known to practice torture; it, has
however, denied the allegation that it has sent the suspects for the purpose of torture.4 Some of the debate
around the Arar case involves the issue of extraordinary
rendition. However, as discussed below, other significant
issues in Canada – US intelligence cooperation have also
been highlighted.
The primary source of information for this article is
the Arar Commission.5 The Commission was established
in early 2004 to undertake two primary tasks. First, Justice O’Connor would investigate the actions of Canadian
officials in relation to Arar’s detention and deportation.
Second, because the Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) was the primary agency involved in this case, he
would make recommendations on a review mechanism
for its activities with respect to national security. In other
words, there was a factual component to the investigation, as well as a long-term policy dimension. The Commission released its findings between September and December 2006. It should be noted that the Arar Commission invited the governments of the United States, Jordan
and Syria to participate in the hearings; but all three parties declined. The findings of the Report are based on
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the testimonies and written evidence of Canadians inany clear or substantive evidence linking Arar to illegal
volved or familiar with the case.
activities, he was incarcerated and tortured for over a year
The Surveillance, Detention, and Rendition of
on suspected terrorist links.
Maher Arar. Soon after the attacks of 9/11, Canadian
Information Sharing between the US and Canand American law enforcement and security authorities
ada. The Arar Report investigates, in detail, the circummet in order to generate greater cooperation in antistances leading to Arar’s detention and rendition. It conterrorism activities. Canadian agencies were asked to includes that, contrary to comments made by American
vestigate individuals in Canada who allegedly had ties to
officials, Canadian officials were not involved with Arar’s
suspected terrorists. In early October 2001, the RCMP
detention and rendition. At the same time, the informabegan investigating Abdullah Almalki, who was believed
tion provided by the RCMP did play a critical role in the
to be connected to Al-Qaeda. Arar entered the RCMP’s
decisions made by American authorities. Justice O’Coninvestigations on October 12, 2002, when he was witnor was particularly concerned about this and recomnessed meeting Almalki in Ottawa.
mended changes to the information sharing process to
Maher Arar was born in Syria and arrived in Canada
prevent a recurrence of this situation.
on September 1, 1987. He obtained his Canadian citizenJustice O’Connor was particularly critical of the fact
ship on September 28, 1995. Arar holds a graduate dethat the RCMP made several inaccurate and baseless
gree in telecommunications and was employed as a comstatements about Arar and his wife to the American aumunications engineer with The MathWorks, Inc., in Nathorities. This included alleging, without supporting evitick, Massachusetts. He had both an American and a Cadence, that they were linked to Al-Qaeda. Several other
nadian social security number and was a frequent traveler
problems were also found in the processes governing Cabetween the two countries. After
nadian cooperation with the
he was seen meeting Almalki,
US. First, information was
… I strongly endorse the importance of
Canadian authorities put him unshared without attaching writder occasional surveillance and
ten caveats, in contravention of
information sharing. Sharing informafinancial scrutiny. They also conconventional RCMP policy.
tion across borders is essential for protacted U.S. Customs, the U.S.
The absence of caveats could
tecting Canada’s national security interImmigration and Naturalization
increase the risk that the inforService (INS) and the FBI about
mation would be used by the
ests, in that it allows more complete and
him.
receiving party for purposes
accurate
assessments
of
threats
to
our
On September 26, 2002,
that violates Canadian practices
security…
However, information
while passing through John F.
or values. The rendition of a
Kennedy International Airport in
Canadian citizen to Syria withmust be shared in a principled and reNew York on his way to Canada,
out the approval of Canadian
sponsible manner.
(Arar Report, p. 22)
Arar was detained by American
authorities was just such a
officials. On October 7, 2002,
situation. Second, in April
the Regional Director of the INS issued an order finding
2002, the Canadian authorities provided American agenArar to be a member of Al-Qaeda and directing his recies with its entire investigative database, in the form of
moval from the United States. He was then flown to Jorthree compact discs, without screening the information
dan and eventually taken to Syria, where he was imprisbeforehand or attaching written caveats. This, too, was
oned for almost a year. He returned to Canada after his
faulted by the Arar Commission.
release on October 5, 2003.
Justice O’Connor believes that these errors were
Based on evidence provided by Arar and extensive
committed because the officers assigned to the countertestimony by human-rights experts, the Arar Report conterrorism investigations had inadequate training. While
cluded that Arar was tortured during his imprisonment in
he believes that prompt information sharing and other
Syria. In addition, the Commission concluded that there
forms of transnational cooperation were, and continue to
was no evidence to suggest that Arar’s activities constibe, crucially important; so is proper training and due dilituted a threat to the security of Canada. The report
gence.6 The Report acknowledges that information sharnoted that he was never charged with any offence in Caning across countries is necessary in order to deal with
ada, the United States or Syria. Arar appeared to be, for
transnational organizations such as Al-Qaeda. At the
the duration of the RCMP's investigations, a “person of
same time, such cooperation must include a great deal of
interest” (someone whose role and complicity is not
circumspection and careful consideration of the use to
clear), rather than someone about whom criminal eviwhich the information will be put. For example, infordence is being collected. In sum, despite the absence of
mation shared with an agency or country that is known to
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use torture, such as Syria, might affect Canada’s commitment to the global prevention of torture. The Justice also
expressed concern about possible Canadian involvement
in the American policy of rendition, a practice to which
Canada seems opposed.
The Report makes some key recommendations to
correct the mistakes made by Canadian authorities in the
Arar case. These recommendations are relevant to information sharing between Canada and the US in both directions. First, written protocols that clarify the process
of cross-border information sharing are necessary to ensure greater accountability. Implicit or verbal agreements
with foreign agencies should be avoided. Second, cooperative arrangements should be subject to periodic review
to ensure prompt attention to problems such as those
that arose during the Arar case. In addition, sensitivity to
cultural and human rights issues should be an essential
component of training in national security matters, particularly in relation to Muslim and Arab communities. It
is possible that the need to formulate and follow protocol
was minimized in the post-9/11 crisis mode. Future
cross-border information sharing should be predicated
upon clear procedural guidelines.
The treatment to which Arar was subjected in Syria
was of particular concern to the Commission. Justice
O’Connor was categorical in stating that the use of torture “can never be legally justified.”7 It is worth noting
that Canada is one of the leading advocates of the International Criminal Court, and is a signatory to several international treaties prohibiting the use of torture, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, the United Nations Torture Declaration and the Convention Against Torture. In addition,
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms clearly rejects the use of torture. O’Connor believes that information should not be shared with a foreign country if there
is a credible risk that it will cause or contribute to the use
of torture. Information sharing policies should include
specific directions aimed at eliminating any possible Canadian complicity in torture, avoiding the risk of other
human rights abuses and ensuring accountability.
Another major concern of the Arar Report was the
impact of Canada – US cooperation on Canadian privacy
laws. Justice O’Connor noted at several points in the Report that the RCMP provided information to American
authorities that did not comply with Canadian policies on
sharing information and screening processes. In particular, the Report was concerned with the Canadian authorities’ decision to provide the Americans with its entire database of investigations. The Report emphasizes the fact
that need for security cooperation must be counterbalanced with the importance to protecting the privacy of
Canadian citizens. Justice O’Connor recommended that

security personnel be trained in information sharing practices and be told that there processes should comply with
privacy laws.
Policy implications. The Arar case has significant
policy implications, both specific to Canada – US relations and to the broader issue of transnational cooperation in security. The Arar Report underlines the importance of continued close cooperation between the US and
Canada in counterterrorism efforts. Justice O’Connor
cites the findings of both the American 9/11 Report and
the Canadian report on the Air India bombing in 1985 to
support this view.8 Both documents stress the need for
intelligence sharing in security matters. Productive cooperation is reflected in the Integrated Border Enforcement
Teams (IBETs), which enable the RCMP, Canada Border
Services, Citizenship and Immigration Canada, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Coast Guard and
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement to work
together.
The cooperative and interdependent dimensions of
Canada – US relations do not, however, mitigate the concerns that arose out of the Arar case. The Report is critical of the way in which the Americans treated Arar. In
addition, Canadians are unhappy with the reluctance of
the American to cooperate with the Canadian inquiry into
the case. Justice O’Connor and the RCMP seem strongly
opposed to the practice of extraordinary rendition, an
opinion that is likely shared by many Canadians.
Justice O’Connor notes that, since the Arar case, the
RCMP has developed a greater sensitivity to, and awareness, of the risks to Canadians accused of links to AlQaeda when they are in the United States. It is not clear
how, specifically, this sensitivity and awareness has translated to actual action. Nonetheless, it is likely that Canadian authorities will in the future be far more cautious in
cooperating with the US in investigating Canadian citizens.
Do these developments indicate reluctance, in the
future, to engage in bilateral security cooperation? The
answer to this question would be “no.” Canada and the
US both recognize that intelligence sharing is necessary
for effective counterterrorism activities. The Arar case
demonstrates, however, that cooperation and coordination, even between close allies, can create tension points.
This is because one party may engage in actions that
compromise the laws, practices and protocols of the
other. As the Arar Commission points out, such situations point to the need for checks and procedures to
monitor information exchange and use. At the same
time, oversight protocols should not undermine expediency and effectiveness in the overall effort. Many experts
endorse the suggestion that the need for efficiency in intelligence sharing must be balanced with a continuing em-
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phasis on following established procedures.9 Achieving
such a balance is challenging, but necessary. One suggestion has been the creation of a bilateral organization, consisting of officials from both countries, which would
oversee intelligence and information sharing.10 Under the
doctrine of sovereignty, it is certainly the right of both
countries to refrain from sharing information that pertains to national security or the privacy of citizens.
Shared security goals, however, necessitate close collaboration in the development and exchange of intelligence.
Officials in both countries need to develop better practices and institutions to achieve this goal.
* Bidisha Biswas is an assistant professor of political
science at Western Washington University.

Endnotes
1.

The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation provides a detailed
time line on the case. See http://www.cbc.ca/news/
background/arar/
2. http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/arar/Chertoff-Gonzalesletter-to-Day.pdf
3. See Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 2006. "Arar Report
Puts US 'Rendition' Policy Into Spotlight." Accessible at http://
www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/09/20/arar-reaction.html
4. In April 2006, the Congressional Research Service released a
report for the United States Congress entitled “Renditions: Constraints Imposed by Laws on Torture.” See http://www.fas.org/
sgp/crs/natsec/RL32890.pdf
5. The full version of the report can be found at http://
www.ararcommission.ca. Unless otherwise noted, information
provided in this report is gleaned from the Commission’s findings.
6. Note that Justice O’Connor was also critical of internal decisions and actions made by Canadian officials. For example, the
report says that Canadian authorities leaked confidential and
sometimes inaccurate information about the case to the media in
order to discredit Arar and protect government interests.
7. Note that the use of torture in efforts to combat terrorism has
been subject to some debate and contention in the United
States. O’Connor’s report has no such equivocation on the issue.
8. The 9/11 Commission Report is available at http://www.911commission.gov/. The Air India Report is available at http://
www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/ns/airs/_fl/rep1-en.pdf
9. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/topics/pubs/Canada_6.pdf
10. http://www.ifpa.org/confwrkshp/canadawkshp/wrkshp.htm

